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Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between central bank independence (CBI) and inflation in
Indonesia during 1970-2006. Using partial adjustment Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Engel Granger Error
Correction Model, the result shows that legal CBI index inversely affect the inflation, while the turnover
of governor is not significant. This result emphasizesBank Indonesia to strengthen its independency in
order to achieve his inflation target.
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I. INTRODUCITON
Indonesia had been severely affected by Asian economic crisis in 1997. At that time, Indonesia
experienced multidimensional economic problems including large current account deficit and
exchange rate depreciation. An increase in uncertainty pushed the capital out, followed by
liquidity problem in many banks. As the lender of last resort, Bank Indonesia provided liquidity
borrowing for the banks, nevertheless, these led to increase in money supply and trigger
hyperinflation.
One possible source of the crisis in 1997 is that the central bank was not independent.
In previous political regime (Order Lama), the central bank always financed the government
budget deficit by printing money. During the new regime (Order Baru), the central bank was
mandated to support the government’s goals to sustain economic growth and to reduce
unemployment. Accordingly, it was very difficult for the Bank Indonesia to pursue price stability
as its main objective. Later in 1999, Bank Indonesia became legally independent, along with
the rising awareness and also theoretical and empirical evidencethat independent central bank
is required to achieve price stability. This was also a recommendation of the IMF for economic
recovery after the crisis. Through Law No.23/1999 the central bank responsibility hadbeen more
focus from multiple objectives to single objective of price stability.
The basic theory of the central bank independence is inflation bias theory. Inflationary
bias reflects price instability that will determine the basic prices of all economic activities. It will
affect the economy through the purchasing power of the national currency. With unstable prices,
people worry about the real value of their money being discounted by inflation. Furthermore,
unstable price will increase uncertainty and create economic instability.
However, appointing a conservative central banker to pursue the price stability is debatable
since many researchers find different results. Some researchers suggest that the central bank
independence can create low inflation, while the other found no correlation between Central
Bank Independence (CBI) and inflation. Generally, a negative correlation between legal CBI
index and inflation is found in the industrial countries while in the developing countries, it is
not significant. On the other hand, the governor turnover of central bank as informal indicator
of CBI is generally positively correlated to inflation in the developing countries but it is not
significant in the industrial or developed countries.
The purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between CBI and inflation
in Indonesia using annual data from 1970 to 2006. This research uses two indicators of CBI;
legal index and TOR constructed by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapty (CWN) (1995). We use
two models; Ordinary Least Square (OLS) by using partial adjustment model and Engel Granger
Error Correction Model (EGECM) to identify the impact of CBI on inflation, and to investigate
the long-run equilibrium of inflation.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I is theoretical adjustment for
central bank independent. In section II, the research presents previous empirical evidence of
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol15/iss4/3
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the central bank independence effect on price stability. Section III discusses the result found in
Indonesia. The last section is conclusion and policy implication.

II. THEORY
2.1. Basic Model of Central Bank Independency
Inflation bias occurs under discretionary monetary policy where central bank is controlled or at
least intervened by government. Within this condition, if central bank knows public expectations,
he tends to create inflation surprise to increase seignorage income and to push real economic
activity; employment and output. However, in the next period people will no longer believe
the central bank and set higher expectations. Inflation will be higher than it should have been
as inflation is a function of expected inflation. In this case, the central bank is perceived to not
be credible, hence it will be more difficult to manage inflation.
There are three reasons why central banks should be independent; first, public choice
theory explains that central banks get political pressure from a government to finance the
government budget deficit through easy money policy (Eijffinger 1997). Second, when fiscal
authority is dominant, monetary authorities will not be able to control government budget
deficit, hence the supply of money become endogenous. This condition is possible when the
central bank is not independent (Sargent and Wallace, 1981 cited in Eijffinger 1997). Third,
there is a ‘time inconsistency’ problem, where the policy is no longer optimal to respond the
original plan (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983; Rogoff, 1985).
One solutionfor the inflation bias is to delegate monetary policy to an independent
‘conservative’ central banker (Rogoff, 1985; Barro and Gordon, 1984; Walsh, 2003). Central
bank is independent when he is free from political pressure or government intervention,
including free from the government’s temptation to increase seignorage by increasing money
supply, (Alesina andSummers (1993). Moreover, independent central bank should only has single
objective; price stability, which implies that central banks focus more on inflation than output
growth. Within this framework, the central bank can formulate monetary policy to achieve
price stability, independent from any political interference (Ahsan, 2006; Pollard, 1993).
The central bank is also not allowed to buy government’s obligation in primary market.
This means the government is not permitted to borrow money from the central bank. The
government should choose ways within his authorities such as raising taxes, issuing bills, or
borrowing from conventional banks to finance its expenditure rather than borrowing from the
central bank.
Before looking at the various result of empirical evidence, this paper provides basic model
of inflation bias and CBI.We use Rogoff model (1985) as starting point. This model compares
the loss function between discretionary monetary policy and conservative central banker (by
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rule). Inflation under the discretionary monetary policy is analyzed by Barro and Gordon (1983)
adopting the Lucas-Island supply function.

yt = yn + a (π t − π te ) + ε t

(1)

where yt is output; yn is natural rate of output; pt isinflation; pet is expected inflation; and
isreal shock.

et

Output in this model is a function of labor and capital (Cobb Douglas). When actual
inflation is greater than expected inflation, the real wages will drop since the expected real wage
is lower and the firm will absorb employees. On the other hand, whenever actual inflation is
less than expected one, the real wages will increase and firm will reduce employees.
Under discretionary monetary policy, the central bank minimizes the following social
loss function:

L=

1 2 λ
2
π t + (y t − yn − k )
2
2

(2)

Where l is society’s preference for output, and kis constant. Parameter k is imperative in this
model. Under discretionary monetary policy, on stabilizing output and inflation, the central
bank will set the output to be around yn+k, while inflation will fluctuate around zero.
A simple relationship between inflation and the actual policy instrument adopted by
policy maker gives:

π = ∆m + v

(3)

where Dm is the growth rate of money supply (first difference of the log nominal supply of
money), and V is the velocity shock. In setting Dm, this model assumes that expected inflation
is given, supply shock (et) is observable by central bank but not velocity shock (vt); and also et
and vt are uncorrelated.
Initially, private sector set wages based on expected inflation. The private agent must
commit to the nominal wage contract before the central bank set the growth rate of nominal
money supply. Under discretionary monetary policy, the central bank care about output and
tries to reduce output variation by choosing inflation. In this case, the central bank has the
opportunity to create inflation different from private agent’s expectation.
The effect of discretionary policy on inflation rate is obtained by substituting equation
(1) and (3) into the central bank loss function (2), then take first order condition with respect
to money growth:

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol15/iss4/3
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V =

[(

1
λ a ∆m + v − π e + e − k
2

)

[(

)

357

] + 12 (∆m + v )
2

2

]

0 = λ a ∆m + −π e + e − k + (∆m )
∆m =

a 2 λπ e + aλ (k − e)
1 + a 2λ

(4)

Equation (4) shows that aggregate supply shock occurs since the central bank wants to minimize
output variability (l) around its target and then result in high inflation. There is a tradeoff
between inflation and output variability. The more a central bank wants to minimize output
variability (l), the greater inflation will be (Dm). Private sectors will use this equation as their
expectation. Therefore, optimal policy depends on expected inflation of private agent’s. The
expected inflation is formed from observing the aggregate supply shock (e) as follows:

π e = E [∆m]=

a 2 λπ e + aλk
1 + a 2λ

pe = alk > 0, substitute this into (3) and use (4) to get equilibrium rate of inflation under
discretionary policy:

 aλ 
e+v
π d = ∆m + v = aλk − 
2 
1+ a λ 

(5)

Equation 5 shows that positive average inflation rate equals to alk. The determinant of inflation
bias is distortion (k), the effect of money supply on output (a) and the weight of central bank
to pursue output objective (l). When private agents are able to anticipate this rate completely,
it will have no effect on output.
If monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank (conservative), central
bank puts weight on inflation, and inflation will be:

π d (δ ) = ∆m + v =

aλ k
aλ


aλ k − 
e+v
2 
1+ δ
1+ δ + a λ 

(6)

This equation implies that inflation bias will be lower since 1+d>1 or d>0, and this tends to
reduce the loss function. However, the coefficient of aggregate supply shock (e) is also lower,
implying the central bank does not respond sufficiently to aggregate supply shock (e). In other
words, when the central bank cares more about inflation than output stabilization, inflation
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bias will be lower.Yet, this will lower output stabilization. Based on this result, many researchers
conclude that lower average inflation can be achieved by assigning a conservative independent
central bank; however at the cost of lower output stabilization. Thus, a trade-off between lower
average inflation and high output variability is expected to occur.
Berger, Haan and Eijffinger (2001) use another simple equation to explain the theory of
central bank independency (see equation 7). This model adopts the same loss function equation
and Lucas-Island supply function, and also inflation under rational expectation as in Barro and
Gordon model. Under discretionary policy type of central bank, inflation is:

π t = χyt* −

χ
µt
χ +1

(7)

The first right hand side term is inflationary bias. When a country has high inflationary bias, it
implies that a government pushes big surprise on inflation. The second term is the degree of
stabilization of output shock that will affect inflation. Loss function becomes:

Lcb =

1+ ε 2 λ
π t + ( y t − y t* ) 2
2
2

(8)

However, when a central bank is independent or conservative, inflation will be:

πt =

χ
χ
y t* −
µt
1 + γε
1 + γε + χ

(9)

Comparing inflation rate under discretionary policy in equation (7) and conservative (independent)
central bank in equation (9) shows that inflation can be lower under independent central
bank than discretionary policy. The key parameter is g and e. When both values are positive,
inflation rate will be lower. This means that by delegating monetary policy to a conservative
central banker will create positive value of g and e, thus inflation will be lower. Conversely,
when g or e is equal to zero, the central bank has the same preference of inflation aversion as
the government, implying independency of central bank does not matter. This is in line with
Eijffinger and Hoebericht (1998):

M t = γLcb + (1 − γ ) LG ,
where g is the degree of CBI, and as g=1, the central bank is fully independent.
However, a conservative central banker alone is not sufficient to achieve price stability
since it provides too little response on the shock. Lohmann (1992) argues that appointing a
central banker to fight inflation is better idea, but discharges him when the shock is too large.
This way, the central banker will stay responsive to output stabilization. Walsh (1995) provides
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol15/iss4/3
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alternative solution for inflation bias problem which is known as ‘Optimal Walsh Contracts’. He
suggestsproviding bonus for the central banker when inflation is successfully reduced, instead
of appointing a central banker. This approach is more contractual than institutional solution.

2.2. Empirical Evidence
Empirically, whether higher degree of CBI is associated with the lower inflation is still controversial
among economists. The empirical evidence shows that there is a negative relationship between
the degree of CBI and average inflation such as Grilli et al (1991), Cukierman et.al. (1992),
Alesina and Summer (1993), Berger (2000) Jacome (2007), Hayo and Voigt (2005), Hicks (2004),
Eijffinger et.al., (1998).
The correlation between CBI and inflation is described in Figure 1. Switzerland and
Germany with a high CBI degree have low inflation. In Japan, Canada and Netherlands, their
moderate CBI degree is associated with average inflation. Similarly, New Zealand with low CBI
has high inflation. Thus, the higher degree of CBI is associated with lower inflation rate, vice
versa.
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Figure 1
Relationship between CBI and Average Inflation

Nonetheless, Luna (2003)claims that there is no correlation between CBI and inflation.
Using cross-country panel data among 23 OECD countries, he suggests that low inflation can be
achieved without delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank. A low inflation is
more related to exchange rate target rather than a conservative central bank. Using institutional
reform as a proxy for CBI, he detects that price stability was achieved after the implementation
of independence reform only for Spain, Greece, New Zealand, Portugal and Italy.
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In contrast to Luna, Jong (2002) result finds a negative correlation between CBI and
inflation in OECD countries. He suggests that the negative correlation appears because of cultural
factors where people do not like uncertainty. An unclear correlation is found by Campilo and
Miron (1996) but their result contrast with Luna (2003). Their panel regression across countries
shows that exchange rate regime is not important to determine inflation. The more important
factors are economic fundamentals such as openness and optimal tax.
Pollard (1993) has the same result but finds that an independent central bank will harm
economic growth. He argues that an independent central bank can increase policy conflict
with a government since they have difference preferences; and if this is evident, the economic
growth will be lower.
Economists not only focus on whether CBI promotes price stability, but also whether it
responds to economic performance. Waud (1995) points out that CBI will improve the tradeoff between inflation and economic performance as assumed in Philip curve. An independent
central bank can create low inflation and low growth as well. However, Fisher (cited in Eijffinger
(1997)) argues that the tradeoff occurs only in the short term. In the long term, the Philip
curve is vertical, implying monetary policy will only influence inflation; hence there is no clear
correlation between CBI and output.
Those various outcomesmay be originated from different measures of CBI. Seminal work of
Bade and Parkin’s (1988) measures the relationship between the central bank and government
as ‘budgetary’. They create an index based on the institutional relationship between central
bank and government.
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) presented another index known as the GMT
Index, based on political and economic independence measures. Using government deficit that
financed by central bank, they found negative correlation between CBI and inflation.
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) introduce the CWN index. They divide the
measurement into two categories; Central Bank Independence (CBI) legal index and the rate
of turnover of the central bank governor (TOR). The legal CBI index is significantly negative
correlated with inflation in developed countries, but is insignificant for developing countries. TOR
is positively correlated in less developed countries but uncorrelated in industrial countries.
The measurement of CBI adopted in many empirical studies has augmented the diversity
of the substantial result to explain the effect of CBI on inflation.Alesina and Summer (1982)
and Jacome (2001, 2007) adopting the expansion index of GMT and CWN results a negative
correlation between the CBI and inflation. Panagiotidis (2005) confirms the same result using
the CWN index for the case of Greece.
Voig (2005) adopts the degree of de facto of central bank as measurement of CBI and
finds negative correlation between CBI and inflation. However, TOR as an informal proxy for
CBI provides a positive correlation.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol15/iss4/3
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Campilo and Miron (1997) actually found the same result as Cukierman (1992) but
reached a different conclusion. They claim there is no correlation between CBI and inflation
because they find that CWN index was negatively significant only in high income countries and
positively insignificant in developing countries. When they pooled the sample together, the
result is unclear. This is similar with Cukierman (1992) who found the index is only significant
in developed countries.
The other reason why empirical evidence provides different results is different exchange
rate regime. A country with fixed exchange rate regimewill lose its independence; conversely,
strong effect of CBI on inflation can be found on a country under the floating exchange rate
(Cukierman 2001).
Empirical model and estimation technique are other possible source for different result..
Many previous studies find there is a positive or no correlation between CBI and inflation
because they use an econometric methodology that does not account for error in the proxies
of index. Consequently, the results show spurious estimation. For example Campilo and Miron
(1997) and Ismihan and Ozkan (2004) estimate inflation directly on the proxy of CBI using
ordinary least square (OLS) without calculating the error on the CBI index. They find there is
no significant relationship between CBI and inflation.
Brum (2002, 2006) suggests that the problem in such estimations can be solved by analysis
of the covariance structure. This method calculates an error in CBI index. Thus, the estimation
will produce an unbiased estimator. Based on the empirical evidence, Brum (2002) uses this
method to estimate Campilo and Morin (1997) and Ismihan and Ozkan (2003) model, and
find CBI is significant negatively correlated with inflation even in developing countries sample.
Hicks (2004) uses the ARIMA process and produces a negative correlation between CBI and
inflation.

III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Variable and Data
The dependent variable (inflation) is proxied with Consumer Price Index (CPI). Independent
variables contain of legal index of central bank independence (legal CBI), turnover of central
bank governor (TOR), money supply (M1), exchange rate (ER) and lag CPI;the latter three are
control variables. All data are annual from 1970 to 2006.
The inflation rate was measured as the log of annual percentage in Consumer Price Index
(CPI). The CPI data were taken from International Financial Statistic (IFS) based on CPI for 17
capital cities from 1970 to 2006 by using the base year of 1993.
The independence index covers both low (close to zero) and high degree of independence
(close to one). This way, this research is able to include all data from 1970 until 2006 without
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having to divide them in two categories before and after independence law (Law No. 23/1999)
was released.
(Scales)
0.0
Too dependence

0.5

1.0
Too independence

The legal index of central bank independence for Indonesia was formulated by Cukiermen,
Webb and Neyapty (CWN Index). This index is measured based on 16 characteristics, generated
from the relationship between the Bank Indonesia and the government. The characteristics are
categorized into four main clusters; first is Chief Executive Officer (CEO), which contains proxies
for governing period and dismissal of the central bank governor, who appoints the governor,
and his/her capability to hold another office. Second is the policy formulation variable; contains
proxies for who formulate policies, final decision involvement, and the degree of the central
bank’s participation in formulating the government budget. The third is central bank objective
variable; contains question whether central bank has single objective (price stability) or multiple
objectives (price stability, growth, unemployment). The fourth is the limitation of central bank’s
lending to government; contains proxies for advances and securitizes lending, the authority
of central bank to regulate the term of maturity of lending, the potential borrowers from
central bank, the type of lending limitation, the maturity of loan, interest rate of the loan, and
prohibition of central bank to buy government securities in primary market.
Using these 16 variables, the index of CBI is calculated with scaling method. The scale
lies between 0 (zero) and 1 (one)2. For the period of 1970 to 1998, we use index calculated by
Cukiermen, Webb and Neyapty (1995) for some developed and developing countries including
Indonesia.Legal CBI index from 1999 to 2006 were primary data, collected through survey in
Bank Indonesia. The set of questions are the same as in CWN index.
Another indicator used in this research as the measurement of independence is turnover
of central bank governor (TOR). CWN suggest turnover of central bank governor as an informal
indicator to measure independence. This idea based on the assumption that the higher governor
turnover, the greater the possibility of central bank’s dependence on the political authority.This
assumption occurs only in developing countries, and not in countries with stable authoritarian
government such as Denmark and United Kingdom, (Cukiermen 1995).
The turnover of the central bank governor (TOR) is measure based on the average change
of the governor in years. More specifically, Cukiermen (1995) noted the formula as:
Average Annual Turnover of central
bank governor

2

=

Number of years
Number of governor changes

The calculation is available on the author upon request.
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The critical value of average annual TOR lies between 0.2 and 0.5. This is due to the electoral
cycle in every four or five years. If electoral cycle is less than four years, the probability of the
threshold is higher than 0.5; conversely, it will be lower than 0.2 when the electoral cycle
is more than five years. For Indonesia case, the threshold of turnover rate before 1970 was
unstable, hence lies probably between 0 and 0.6. After 1970, the critical range is probably
between 0 and 0.2.
The first control variable used in this research is narrow money as proxy for money
supply. The second control variable is an exchange rate variable which is predicted also has a
significant correlation with inflation. Both money supply and exchange rate data are gathered
from International Financial Statistic (IFS). Another variable is inflation expectation, proxied with
lag of log CPI, which is expected to have a positive correlation with current inflation.

3.2. Estimation Technique
Initially we identify the correlation between two indicators of central bank independence
included in the model using Spearman’s correlation. Gujarati (1995) suggests that all explanatory
variables should be independent each other or they have low correlation. If they are strongly
correlated, they are not be able used as independent variables together. Conversely, if they
are weakly correlated, we can put them together as independent variables. The next step is
estimating the equation using Ordinary Least Square (OLS):

PI = c + α 1 LegalCBI + α 2TOR + α 3 Log (m1) + α 4 Log (er )

(10)

Panagiotidis (2005) estimates transformation inflation on indicators of CBI (Legal CBI and
TOR) and dummy (capturing different regimes such as Bretton Wood System, Flexible Exchange
Rate mechanism and Maastricht regime). On the other hand, this paper estimated inflation on
both indicators of CBI and money supply and exchange rate as control variables.
Estimating equation (10) using OLS probably subject to spurious estimation when the
included variables have unit root. Following Enders (2004), the alternative is first-difference form.
Furthermore, to anticipate the autocorrelation issue, we put lag of inflation to see correlation
of change in previous inflation on change in current inflation. Lag of inflation is reasonable
theoretically, since we can see the relationship between expected inflation and inflation. These
considerations will lead us to the following empirical model:

dPI t = c + α1d ( PI ( −1)) + α 2 d ( LegalCBI ) t + α 3d (TOR ) t
+ α 4 d ( Log (m1)) t + α 5 d ( Log ( er )) t + ε t
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Based on Gujarati (1995) and Wooldridge (2006), we can use this model as long as there is no
serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity problem. Although d(P1(-1)) depends
on et-1 and all previous disturbance terms, it is not correlated to the current error term et.
Therefore, as long as et is serially independent, d(P1(-1)) will also independent or uncorrelated
to et.
The model satisfies the OLS assumption especially for nocorrelation between explanatory
variables and stochastic disturbance term. We check the serial correlation problem with
Godfrey- Breusch Test known as the LM-test. We use white heteroscedasticity test for the
heteroscedasticity problem and see the correlation test for the multicollinearity problem.
Further stationarity check on the error of equation (12) is important to find out whether
the variables in equation are cointegrated, meaning there is a long run relationship among
the variables on the model, (Enders, 2004). There are two types of ECM we can use; Engel
Granger Error Correction Model (EGECM) and Wickens-Breusch Error Correction Model, as
explained below.
For the Engel Granger ECM, first we estimate the residual error term: et = yt-a1-a2x1 and,
ˆ
∆ε t = β1 εˆt −1 then a simple ECM can be formulated as ∆y t = α1 + α 2 ∆xt + α 3 εˆt −1 + ut . If we
assume Autoregressive Distributed Lag (1):

y t = α 0 + α 1 y t −1 + β 0 xt + β1 xt −1 + ε t

(12a)
		

y t − y t −1 = α 0 + α 1 y t −1 − y t −1 + β 0 xt + β1 xt −1 + ε t

(12b)
		

dyt = α 0 + (α 1 − 1) y t −1 + β 0 ( xt − xt −1 ) + β 0 xt −1 + β1 xt −1 + ε t

(12c)
		

dyt = α 0 + (α 1 − 1) y t −1 + β 0 dxt + ( β 0 + β1 ) xt −1 + ε t


 β + β1 
 xt −1  + ε t
dyt = α 0 + β 0 dxt − (α1 − 1)  yt −1 −  0
 α1 − 1 



(12d)

		
(12e)
		

dyt = α 0 + β 0 dxt − λECt −1 + ε t

(13)

The equation (13) is the typical Engel Granger Error Correction Model, where -lECt-1 is known
as error correction term and l is speed of adjustment parameter. The larger value of l, the
greater the adjustment of previous deviation to the long run equilibrium; conversely, the lower
value of l imply small short-run adjustment of deviation back to equilibrium. Following above
procedure, we can specify our empirical model of Engel Granger ECM as:
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol15/iss4/3
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d ( PI ) t = α 0 + β 0 d (CBI ) t + β 0 d (TOR) t + β1 d (log(m1)) t + β 2 d (log(er )) t
+ λECt −1 + ε t

(14)

The second error correction specification is Winkens-Breusch Error Correction model.
This model can explain long-run relationship between dependent and independent variable,
and furthermore provide alternative valid way to test misspecification of presumed model.
Recalling equation (13b):

y t − y t −1 = α 0 + α 1 y t −1 − y t −1 + β 0 xt + β1 xt −1 + ε t
y t − α 1 y t = α 0 + α 1 y t −1 − α 1 y t + β 0 xt − β1 xt + β1 xt + β1 xt −1 + ε t
(1 − α 1 ) y t = α 0 − α 1 dyt + ( β 0 + β1 ) xt − β1 dxt ) + ε t
yt =

α0
β + β1
α1
β1
−
dy t + 0
xt −
dxt + ε t
1 − α1 1 − α1
1 − α1
1 − α1

y t = λ0 − λ1dyt + λ2 xt − λ3dxt + ε t

(15)

Following this equation, the empirical model of Winkens-Breusch is specified as:

PI t = λ0 + λ1 d ( PI ) t + λ 2 d (CBI ) t + λ3 d (TOR) t + λ 4 d (log(m1)) t + λ5 d (log(er )) t
λ6 (CBI ) t + λ7 (TOR) t + λ8 (log(m1))t + λ9 (log(er ))t + ε t

(16)

Since there is endogeneity problem in the model, we need to use Two Stage Least Square
(TSLS); hence a set of instrumental variables (IV).

IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
Preliminary inspection shows all variables in first difference (inflation, central bank independence
index, governor turnover, money supply and the exchange rate) are stationary. The residual of
the model is also stationary, which confirm the presence of cointegration among the variables.
We also test the correlation between legal CBI index and TOR (turnover of central bank governor)
by using Spearman’s correlation test. The result shows both indicators are weakly correlated
(0.28).
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The estimation result is presented below.We have checked the model is free from serial
correlation problem using Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (F-statistic = 0.632533
and p = 0.538934). The hypothesis of there is no serial correlation in the model cannot be
rejected at 5 percent level tested by using Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (see table
3). Using correlogram Q-statistics and White’s test, we also confirm the model is free from
heteroscedasticity problem.
Most of the variables are statistically significant at 5 percent level except TOR and the
lag of inflation. The value of indicates that the variation of independent variables can explain
88.16 percent of the dependent variable’s variation.
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The estimation result shows the legal central bank independence (CBI) inversely related
to inflation, which is typically a characteristic of developed countries. This is the opposite of
common findings; where for developing countries, the correlation between legal CBI and
inflation is insignificantly negative. We obtain similar result when using Engel Granger Error
correction model; both indices of central bank independence are also negative and significant,
with similar magnitude (minus 0.78).
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The negative coefficient of CBI shows the lower independency, the higher inflation will
be. The lower the degree of independence is, the weaker the central bank to refuse government
intervention. On this situation, the Central Bank simply implements policy set by the government.
Fiscal authority is more dominant than monetary authority. Based on Sargent and Wallace
(1981) if the fiscal authority is dominant, the monetary authority will be forced to work under
the government instruction. Thus, inflation will be higher since the government focuses more
output or unemployment. Before Central Bank Independence Act No 23/1999, this is evident
for the case of Indonesia.
Prior the implementation of this law, Bank Indonesia (BI) institutionally and practically
depended on government. Bank Indonesia also hadother target such as promoting economic
growth and reducing unemployment beside its core target on stabilizing price and Rupiah.
Because of these many objectives, Bank Indonesia functioned as government’s cashier or a
part of government, including as agent of development. With this twin functions, BI was more
difficult to realize its target, thus, the inflation was high. For example in period 1970-1984
the average inflation rate was 18 percent annually. Indeed, in 1972 until 1973, inflation was
25.80, 30.63 and 41.03 percent respectively (IFS, 2008).
Figure 2 shows the co-movement of inflation and interest rate from 1974 to 2006. In
1970s, the inflation rate was still high and the government took tight money policy. The result
is inflation reduced below the level of 1960s but still above 10 percent. In 1974, inflation rate
was 41.03 percent, mainly due to multi objective of central bank; stabilizing price and as agent
of development, which provide unlimited liquidity for the government.
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Figure 2
Inflation and Interest rate in Indonesia

In 1980s the inflation performance was stable with inflation below 10 percentand
interest rate of around 15 percent. This achievement was obtained through stabilization and
rehabilitation program, followed by financial deregulation and the monetary program such
as enabling conventional banks to set their own interest rate. In 1988, government issued a
deregulation packet known as ‘Pakto’88’, providingeasier procedures to set up new bank and
eventually lead to large increase number of banks.
Before 1999, there are several evident of the non-independency of Bank Indonesia.
One of them is the weakening of Bank Indonesia’s power when the government formed the
monetary council, comprising the governor of the Bank of Indonesia, the minister of trade
and the minister of finance (Raharjo 2002). This will restrict the flexibility of Bank Indonesia to
formulate its own monetary policy, and also reflecting the non-independency on formulating
its target. Within this framework, Bank Indonesia as the monetary authority was allowed to
have various monetary policies; however the implemented policy is subject to government
agreement(Bank Indonesian report, 1966-1984).
Another case was in October 1996 and April 1997, when the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) of BI advised the governing President Suharto to liquidate some banks, but refused (Aris
Munandar 2004). The government argued this bank liquidation would create economic instability
due to the start of election, and eventually Bank Indonesia gave dispensation to those banks
to operate. One year ahead, 1997, the Asian financial crisis occurred.
Beside external factor, the source of economic crisis in 1997 is the government budget
deficit financed by foreign debt. As part of the government, Bank Indonesia always signed
every debt contract for the government (Sitorus 2007). The amount of debt (private and official
loan) increased every year (seeTable 3), and when the Rupiah depreciated, Indonesia suffer
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from a sudden increase of foreign debt. The effect of foreign debt to inflation is similar with
the effect of moneyprinting. Theoretically, financing deficit through foreign debt will reinforce
inflation in the long term, particularly under fixed exchange rate regime(Harkness, Uriarte
1985; Budina, 2001). Without independency, Bank Indonesia will not be able to control the
government budget deficit.
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Trough law No 23/1999, BI is independent. Under this regulation, appoint and dismissal
of central bank chief executive officer is decided by the discretion of central bank board of
governor. Under this law, Bank Indonesia is prohibited to buy the government securities in the
primary market to avoid an increase in the money supply. Moreover, this act also guarantee
the target independency of Bank Indonesia; single objective of price stability.
Post this legal independence, the inflation rate decreased. The Bank of Indonesia exercised
tight money policy and successfully reduce inflation rate from 77.63 percent in 1998 to 2.1
percent in 1999. Average of inflation was around 8 percent from 1999 to 2004. In 2005, the
economy suffered from high inflation (17.11 percent), due to the oil price increase. This was
the highest inflation rate during the post crisis period 1997/1998. In 2006 Bank Indonesia
implemented Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF), and successfully reduced inflationclose to
its target of 6 percent and the exchange rate was Rp 8500 per USD. Nevertheless, this level
of inflation was still higher than other developing countries such as Malaysia and Thailand of
only around 2 percent.
Many attempts had been made by Bank Indonesia to provide better policy conduct.
First is switching the government spending from non-budgetary to budgetary side. Second is
converting interest rate subsidy for liquidity credit into government budget (Djiwandono, 2001)
and third is directly intervening the foreign exchange market to stabilize Rupiah. The latter is also
exercised by Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and Government of Singapore Investment
Corporation (GSIC). The result is the appreciation of Rupiah (Achjar, 2001).
The second measure of central bank independency is the governor turnover. AS presented
earlier, the coefficient of central bank turnover (TOR) is statistically insignificant, which contradict
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to initial hypothesis, even has correct positive sign. Generally, the higher frequent of central
bank governor turnover, the lower degree of independence and the higher inflation will be
(Cukiermen, Webb and Neyapty, 1995). A positive correlation between TOR and inflation is
because political instability affects the central bank instability as well, since the election of central
bank’s governor is affected by political transition. The indicator TOR is relatively stable before
the crisis, 1997. The election cycle of 5 years for the central bank is similar with the cycle of
government election. During the transition process (reformation, 1998-1999), the position of
a central bank governor was major concern of political party; as when Suharto was replaced
by B. J Habibie, J. Soedradjad Djiwandonowas also replaced by Syahril Sabirin (Sabirin 2008)
at the same time.
Worth to mention that even the central bank independence exist by law, Bank Indonesia
needs de-facto independence;the government intervention made by Abdurahman Wahid (the
fourth president of Indonesia) to replace the elected Governor Shahril Sabirin in 2000 is one
of the sample. Such intervention will lead to political instability and weakenthe Indonesian
currency. The governing period of 5 years is too short the central bank to form long-term
policies in order to achieve price stability (Panagiotidis, 2005). A possible option for Indonesia
is to run the governor election in every 10 years as in Federal Reserve of United States, or every
7 years as Deutsche Bundesbank in Germany.
As presented on Table 2, the Engel Granger Error Correction model confirms the long-run
relationship among inflation, exchange rate, money supply and the central bank independence.
The speed adjustment coefficient is 0.37, showing a quite fast correction of inflation deviation
to its long long-run equilibrium. As in standard model, the Engel Granger ECM also explains
the legal CBI index inversely affect inflation while TOR is positive insignificant. The short-run
change in both control variables are also significant in affecting inflation; a short run increase
of money supply will increase inflation significantly, while short-run depreciation of Rupiah
will raise inflation.
Even though the result of estimated model is different from common findings in developing
country, but we can find similar result in Greece, where legal CBI is negatively and significantly
correlated to inflation,(Panagiotidis, 2005). He also found that TOR is also positively correlated
to inflation in lower significant level.

V. CONCLUSION
This research analyzes the relationship between the central bank independence (CBI) and inflation
in Indonesia by using two indicators; legal CBI index and turnover of central bank governor (TOR).
The conclusion of this paper is the central bank independencyinversely affects the inflation.
The implication is straightforward for the Bank Indonesia to strengthen its independency to
achieve low targeted inflation.
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There are several limitations of this paper;first, it is important to internalize the Central Bank
Independence Act No.23, 1999, directly into the model and find out how the implementation of
this law affect the marginal effect of CBI on inflation; second, related to estimation technique,
it is important to apply other method such as Wickens-Breusch model, which believed can
work better.
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